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Clinical Psychology

Its Effects on Ju^or Perception
Walters, P h . D ^ ^

In previous jury outcome research, psychologists have studied
factors such as juror and defendant characteristics, factors of
evidence such as the validity and reliability of eyewitness
testimony, and legal procedural rules. The present study was an
attempt to determine if intentional evidence acts as a moderator
variable in juror decisions concerning the defendant, and if so,
how it influences those decisions.
This study employed a between groups design, utilizing three
groups. Male and female subjects were randomly assigned to one of
three groups and were presented with written case material which
varied in the occurrence or type of intentional evidence.
Depending upon the group to which a subject was assigned, he or
she read either a short transcript of a homicide with evidence of
intent to commit the criminal act, evidence of intent not to
commit the criminal act, or only factual evidence with no
intentional evidence. The subjects then responded to a
questionnaire which asked them to make a dichotomous judgement
between Deliberate Homicide and Negligent Homicide for the
defendant. Subjects were then asked to rate the defendant on the
following on 11 point likert-type scales: a)length of suggested
sentence, b) length of suggested parole, c) likelihood of future
crime, d) defendants level of responsibility, and e) how violent
the defendant was in the criminal act. It was found that evidence
suggesting an intentional act led the jurors to suggest a more
severe verdict, a more severe prison sentence, and longer parole
for the defendant after release from prison, relative to the
suggestions of student jurors who were presented nonintentional
evidence. Defendants associated with intentional evidence were
also perceived as more likely to be involved in future crime, by
female jurors, and were perceived as more violent in their act, by
both male and female subjects.
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INTRODUCTION

History
The field of psychology and law is not a new creation as this
interest and integration dates back to the turn of the century.
According to Tapp and Levine (1977), this history unfolds in four
intellectual stages.

The first of these four stages, the pioneering

stage, was witnessed by Muensterberg's book On the Witness Stand (1908)
in which he applied experimental psychology and its principles to
courtroom procedures.

This attempt, however, was mercilessly criticized

by legal scholars of the day.
The 1930's saw the rise of the realist stage in which attempts were
made to revamp the law in light of psychological learning.

This era

gave us the controversial book by Robinson (Law and Lawyers, 1935), in
which Robinson insisted that every legal problem was a psychological
problem, at its base.

Needless to say, this did not enrich or

ameliorate the tattered relationship between lawyers and psychologists,
which was spawned in the previous stage.

Robinson, however, had a very

important insight which was lost during the ensuing debates.

He

observed that Muensterberg's approach of seeking one-to-one
relationships between existing data and legal problems was unproductive.
Psychological principles developed in the laboratory couldn't be applied
directly to legal problems.
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The third and fourth stages of this history (policy making and
comlng-of-age stages, respectively) were ushered In by the landmark
school desegregation case of Brown v.

Board of Education (1954), and

June Tapp's 1977 Law, Justice, and the Individual iji Society;
Psychological and Legal Issues, respectively (Loh, 1979).

This

comlng-of-age stage describes the current status of the relationship
between psychology and the law.

There Is a collaborative effort which

has been evidenced by an Increasing consciousness that psycholegal
research requires more sensitivity to the lawyer's point of view (Loh,
1981 ).
In general, the history of psycholegal research has been described
as a succession of Interchanges between optimistic psychologists
attempting to "redeem” the law, and a defensive legal community
rejecting the generalization of experimental or laboratory research to
"real life" situations (Loh, 1981).

This tenuous partnership with Its

occasional outright hostility has prevailed until recent times, with
each side carrying on "as though the other side did not exist" (Fahr,

1961).

The comlng-of-age stage, however, has seen a collaborative

effort as was mentioned above.

The conflict has also been mitigated by

the creation and organization of a group of specialists In psycholegal
studies.

Until recently, the majority of those who were writing on

psychology and law did not have the subject as their primary Interest
(Saks, 1979).

Now, rather than the two disciplines working against each

other. It Is more common to find that scholars are engaging In empirical
research which Is Intended to address specific court Issues, as
exemplified In jury studies.
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Psycholegal Research Domains
Over the years, there has been an accumulation of a large amount of
varied information concerning jury studies and the legal process.
Monahan and Loftus (1982) recently reviewed and attempted to synthesize
the major findings of psycholegal research.

Their overview trifurcates

psychology and law into the three functional domains of (1) substantive
law, (2) ways in which the law actually disposes of individual cases,
and (3) the legal process.

Many variables in this third domain have

been studied as they relate to jury trial, and include juror and
defendant characteristics, factors of evidence such as validity of
eyewitness testimony, and legal procedural rules.

It is this third

domain with which the current research is concerned.

(For broader

reviews of jury research see Gerbasi, Zuckerman, and Reis, 1977;
and Hastie, 1978;

Nemeth, 1981;

Saks

and Monahan and Loftus, 1982.)

One important aspect of jury research that has not been adequately
empirically researched is concerned with the effects evidence about
intention (hereafter referred to as "intentional evidence") has on
jurors' perceptions of the defendant, as manifested in trial outcome.
It is this question which the current research intends to address.
Several investigators have studied the effects of intent on attribution
of aggressiveness (Brown and Tedeschi, 1976;
Rule and Duker, 1973;

Holm, 1982;

Nickel, 1974;

and Schwartz et al, 1978) and found that intent

did influence jurors attributions of aggression.

For example. Holm

( 1981) found that the attribution of aggression was influenced by "both
intent and reason." The subjects tended to evaluate not the action, but
rather its antecedents, and they interpreted a "harmful or potentially
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harmful act as aggressive if it was intended and/or the actor had a
reason, such as revenge, for his action." However, these studies have
not directly assessed the effects of intentional evidence on jury
decisions.
Other investigators have focussed on the attribution of
responsibility for one's actions.

Most of the work in this area is

based on the work of Heider (1958), who suggested that attribution of
responsibility varies with the relative amount of personal versus
environmental factors.

He posited five levels or developmental stages

through which an individual passes.

Each level represents an increasing

level of sophistication where there is consideration of new variables,
which may affect attribution of responsibility, at each subsequent
stage.

Level 1 (Association) is the most unsophisticated stage and an

individual is held responsible for any outcome with which he is
associated.

At level 2 (Commission) a person is responsible for any

outcome he produces, even if the consequences are unforseen.

At level 3

(Foreseeability) the individual is held responsible for his actions only
if they produce foreseeable consequences.

At level 4 (Intentionality)

the person is held responsible for any outcome that is intended, and at
level 5 (Justification) the individual's responsibility for intended
outcomes is mitigated if circumstances justify the actions.

Although

several researchers have empirically tested Heider's levels of
responsibility and their relation to outcome intensity (Shaw and Sulzer,
1964;

Sulzer and Burglass, 1968;

Shaw and Reitan, 1969), these studies

were not intended to represent jury situations.

More recently, Harvey

and Enzle (1978) considered the effects of perceived justifiability in
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mock trial situations, but once again the effects of Intent on jury
outcome were not addressed.
Two researchers who have addressed the question of the effects of
Intent are Joann Moral and Mary Bartek (1978).

They were primarily

Interested In recommended punishment as a function of Injurious Intent,
actual harm done, and Intended consequences.

It was expected that the

greater the Injurious Intent and the greater the harm actually done, the
more severe the actual recommended punishment.

Moral suggested that

Intent, which Is a hypothetical construct that refers to what an actor
has In mind prior to performing an act, consists of "three sequential
expectancies having an 'If this, then that' form." This sequential flow
begins with an actor Intending to perform an act(s) In order to cause an
Intended effect(s) that will result In an Intended consequence(s).
Moral and Bartek's results did Indicate that recommended punishment did
vary as a function of Injurious Intent, actual harm done and Intended
consequences.

Mowever, Intended consequences did not Interact with

Injurious Intent or actual harm done.

It was also found that offensive

actors were judged more harshly than defensive actors, which Is a result
consistent with Melder's (1958) level of justifiability as a mitigating
factor.

The results also suggested that recommended punishment was

Independent of predictions of future behavior.
an affect on suggested parole was not addressed.
defined by Moral (Moral, 1977;

Mowever, whether It has
Thus, Intent as

Moral and Bartek, 1978) does have an

affect on recommended punishment.
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Intent has long been an important consideration of our legal
system.

It is an integral factor in discriminating Negligent Homicide

from other forms of Criminal Homicide, and is at the basis of "mens rea"
which is an important aspect of diminished responsibility (although
diminished responsibility has been removed from the mens rea
requirements of homicide in Montana).

As shown above, intent is also

related to perceived aggressiveness and responsibility, yet little if
anything is known about its direct affects on juror and Jury decisions.
The present study addresses this area and examines what affects evidence
concerning intention has on jurors.

The focus

is not on intentionality

as related to the insanity defense

(fdiere mens rea is an issue), but

rather is specifically interested in criminal cases where "not guilty by
reason of insanity" is not an option.

In other words, when a juror is

presented with evidence of intent, how does that affect 1) perceived
responsibility as characterized by a dichotomous choice between two
types of homicide (Negligent Homicide v.

Deliberate Homicide), 2)

length of sentence suggested, 3) length of parole suggested, 4)
perceived likelihood of future crime, and 5) perceived aggressiveness of
the defendant.

In the present study, intent is not conceptualized or

manipulated in the same fashion as in the Horai and Bartek study (1978),
but rather is defined explicitly as statements made by the defendant
prior to the crime or at the time of the crime which refered to his
intentions.

Thus, this study combines Horai's three expectancies

(Intent, act, and consequences), idiere the criminal act and consequences
(to the victim) are held constant.This was not done
Bartek study.

With such a design,

in the Horai and

the effects of the presentation of
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intentional evidence in a jury trial situation should be measurable.
From this it was hypothesized that more aggressive defendants, as
perceived in association with intentional evidence to commit a criminal
act, would be treated more severely by the mock jurors (hereafter, the
use of "intentional evidence" will refer to evidence suggesting an
intentional criminal act, unless otherwise stated).

Concomitant with

this harsher treatment, the defendant would be held more responsible for
his actions, given a longer sentence, receive longer parole, be
perceived as having a greater probability of future crime, and be found
guilty of a more severe crime.

It was also hypothesized that defendants

associated with nonintentional evidence (evidence suggesting a criminal
act was not intended), would be treated less severely by the mock jurors
relative to their control (evidence of fact only) and intentional
criminal act counterparts.

It was expected that the control group would

fall between these two groups containing intentional evidence on all
dependent measures.

These results may be somewhat mediated by the fact

that college students in "mock" jury situations tend to be more lenient
in their judgements than former jurors (Hinkle et al., 1983), and that
tdien faced with a dichotomous verdict decision students are more likely
to choose the lenient verdict (Kaplan and Simon, 1972).

However, even

with such mediating factors, it was hypothesized that the differences
between the Intentional and nonintentional groups on the dependent
measures would be significant.
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METHODOLOGY

Design
A between groups design was employed in which subjects were
randomly assigned to one of three groups.

The three groups differed on

the manipulation of the independent variable, evidence of intent.

Subjects
Subjects were 222 male and female undergraduate volunteers enrolled
in an introductory psychology course at the University of Montana.

Each

subject received credit in exchange for his/her participation.

Materials
Each of the subjects received a booklet containing an introductory
paragraph (Appendix A), the legal definition of homicide as defined by
the state of Montana (Appendix B), a transcription of testimony
(Appendices C, D, and E) and a response questionnaire (Appendix F).
introductory paragraph briefly explained the experimental task.

The

The

subjects were also told that their responses would be compared to those
of actual jurors in order to increase prudent consideration of their
responses to the questionnaire.

Before leaving, the subjects also

completed a demographic questionnaire (Appendix G).

8
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Procedure
Subjects were run in groups ranging in size from twelve to twenty.
Each subject was handed a booklet containing case material and the
response questionnaire, upon entering the room.

Depending upon which

group the subjects had been assigned to, their booklet contained either
evidence of intent to commit the criminal act (Appendix C), evidence of
intent not to commit the criminal act (Appendix D), or only factual
testimony without intentional or nonintentional evidence (Appendix E).
The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three groups prior to
the running of the experiment, and there were equal numbers of males and
females in each group.

Subjects read the case material and responded

individually to the questionnaire, idiere they were asked to make a
dichotomous judgement between Deliberate Homicide and Negligent
Homicide.

Subjects were then asked to rate the defendant on the

following on 11 point likert-type scales:

a) length of suggested prison

sentence, b) length of suggested parole after release from prison, c)
likelihood of future crime for the defendant, d) how responsible they
believe the defendant was for his actions, and e) how physically violent
the defendant was in the act.
Subjects were then asked demographic questions, and what type of
jury experience they had, if any.

They were also asked whether they or

someone close to them had been a victim of a serious violent crime and,
if so, how long ago it occured.

When all the subjects had completed the

questions, they were debriefed about the purpose of the study and their
role in it.

They were then informed that they should not discuss the

study with anyone, because of the possibility of contamination of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

experiment.

Subjects were then asked to sign a statement agreeing not

to discuss the study for four weeks, and booklets were collected.

10
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Data Analysis
The first dependent measure is a dichotomous variable requiring the
verdict choice as either Deliberate Homicide or Negligent Homicide, as
defined by Montana legal code and presented to the subjects.
chi-squared analysis was used to evaluate these results.

A

The remaining

five likert-type items were analyzed with a 3 x 2 (type of evidence by
gender) analysis of variance procedure, in order to determine
differential responses between groups.

Verdict Choice
Of the 222 subjects in the study, 139 chose Deliberate Homicide as
their suggested verdict for the defendant, and this choice was
significantly dependant on the type of evidence read,
(2,N=222)=33.52, £=.00005.

Specifically, of the 74 individuals in the

intentional evidence group, 64 chose Deliberate Homicide as compared to

30 and 45 in the nonintentional and factual evidence groups,
respectively.

As mentioned above, this choice of Deliberate Homicide

was significantly dependant on type of evidence but was not
significantly influenced by gender.

In the nonintentional, intentional,

and factual groups there were 16, 33 and 23 males, respectively, who
opted for Deliberate Homicide.

This is compared to 14, 31 and 22

Deliberate Homicide choices for females in the same groups (see Table
1).

These differences in responding between sexes were so small

(practically non-existent) that it was not seen as beneficial or
necessary to compute the exact multinomial or use a log linear approach
to determine an exact value.

11
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Table 1
Number o f D e l i b e r a t e and N e g l i g e n t Homicide V e r d i c t s Given
by Ex pe rim e nt a l

Group and Gender
GROUP

GUILTY OF
DELIBERATE
HOMICIDE
VERDICT

GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENT
HOMICIDE
VERDICT

NONINTENT

INTENT

. FACT

. MALES=16

MALES=33

MALES=23

- FEMALES=14

FEMALES=31

FEMALES=22

. T0TAL=30

T0TAL=64

T0TAL=45

MALES=21

MALES=4

MALES=14

FEMALES=23

FEMALES=6

FEMALES=15

T0TAL=44

T0TAL=10

TOTAL=29

12
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A chi-squared procedure could not be directly performed on the
differences between the sexes because of the small expected frequency.
Thus, regardless of gender, individuals in the intentional group
significantly more often chose Deliberate Homicide over Negligent
Homicide, relative to the nonintentional group,
2<.00005, and the fact group,

(1,n=148)=33.705),

(1,n=l48)=12.568, g=.0004.

Concomitant

with this finding, the factual evidence group also had significantly
more Deliberate Homicide choices than the nonintentional group, X^
(1,n=148)=6.082, g=.0l4.

These inter-group chi-square values were

compared to the Bonferroni critical values to determine significance
(Dayton and Schafer, 1973)*

Sentence Severity
An analysis of variance could not be done directly on length of
prison sentence because the two scales corresponding to the different
verdicts allowed a different set of responses (100 years max.
Deliberate Homicide vs.

40 years max.

for

for Negligent Homicide).

Thus,

the raw data (actual # of years suggested) were transformed into a
severity score.
sentence.

This score was a percentage of the maximum possible

In other words, a sentence of 20 years on the Deliberate

Homicide scale (0 to 40 years) was transformed to .50 (50% of the scale
was used).

Likewise, a suggested sentence of 50 years on the Deliberate

Homicide scale (0 to 100 years), was transformed to .50.

These

transformations represent the severity of the suggested sentence and
were analyzed by analysis of variance to determine differential
suggested severity of sentence by condition (type of evidence) and

13
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gender.

A main effect for type of evidence was found, F(2,2l6)=6.8l3,

g=.001, while neither gender alone, F(1,216)=.953, £=-330, nor its
interaction with type of evidence, F(2,216)=.008, g=.992, were
significant.

A Neuman-Kuels pairwise comparison indicated that the

intentional group mean of .657, was significantly greater than the
nonintentional group mean of .482, at the .01 level of significance.

In

addition, the intentional group mean (.657) was greater than the fact
group mean (.578) but this difference was not significant at .05.

The

factual group mean was significantly different from the nonintentional
group mean, however, at a significance level between .05 and .06.

(See

figure 1 for a summary of these results.)

Parole
The length of suggested parole was analyzed in the same way the
length of sentence data were analyzed, except no transformations were
necessary.

Type of evidence was again found to be significant,

F(2,216)=4.860, g=.009, with the Intentional evidence group mean (16.81)
being significantly greater at the .05 level than both the
nonintentional group mean (11.43), and the fact group mean (13*08), as
shown by the Neuman-Kuels procedure.

The factual evidence group mean

was greater than the nonintentional group but this difference was not
significant.

Again, neither gender alone, F(1,216)=2.514, g=.11, nor

its interaction with type of evidence, F(2,216)=.594, g=.558, was

14
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significant.

(See figure 2 for a summary of these results.)

Responsibility
An analysis of variance on degree of responsibility showed that
neither type of evidence, F(2,216)=2.630, p=.073, nor gender,
F(1,216)=1.919, g=.l64, were significant.

Future Crime
Data on likelihood of future crime showed a significant main effect
for type of evidence, F(2,216)=9.532, £=.00027, plus a significant
interaction for type of evidence and gender, F(2,216)=6.173, g=.013.
The differences between female and male ratings in the nonintentional
condition was minimal (.3 ), but this difference was intensified in the
intentional (1.11) and factual (1.17) conditions.

A Neuman-Kuels

pairwise comparison showed that the mean female response in the
intentional group (5 .92) was significantly greater than males (3 .38) and
females (3 .68) in the nonintentional group, at the .01 level.

It was

also greater than the males mean response in the fact group (3.97) but
not the females, at the .05 level.

Female mean response in the fact

group (5.14) was significantly greater than the nonintentional male
group (3 .38) as well, but not the female group, at the .05 level.

In

addition, although the intentional group mean for males (4.81) was
greater than males in the fact and nonintentional conditions (3.97), as
well as females in the nonintentional group (3.68), these differences
were not significant at the .05 level.

(See figure 3 for a summary of

16
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these results.)

Level of Violence
Analysis of variance on perceived level of violence showed a
significant main effect for type of evidence, F(2,216)=3.848, g=.022.
Gender alone was not a significant factor, F(1,216)=.996, g=.680, nor
was its interaction with type of evidence, F(2,2l6)=.342, g=.7l6.

A

pairwise comparison showed the intentional group mean (8.53) as
significantly greater than the nonintentional group mean (7.61), at the
.05 level.

Although the intentional group mean was higher than the fact

group (8.03), this was not significant.

In addition, the fact group

mean was greater than the nonintentional group (7.61), but again this
was not significant.

(See figure 4 for a summary of these results.)
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Discussion

General Findings
The purpose of this research was to examine the effects of
intentional evidence (evidence suggesting an intentional act and/or
evidence suggesting a nonintentional act) on juridic decisions.

The

results suggest that when presented with evidence concerning a
defendant's intentions related to the criminal act, the evidence
suggesting intent will Indeed affect juror's perceptions of the
defendant, and concomitantly, regardless of the juror gender, modify the
recommended consequences.

Specifically, evidence that the defendant

intended the act will result in more severe suggested consequences for
the defendant (i.e.

guilty of Deliberate vs.

Negligent Homicide, a

more severe suggested prison sentence and longer suggested parole after
release from prison), when compared to evidence suggesting the act was
not intended.

In addition, evidence suggesting an intentional act will

cause both male and female jurors to perceive the defendant as having
been more violent in the criminal act, relative to what they would
perceive if they were presented with evidence indicative of a
nonintentional act.
There were significant main effects on five of the six measures
utilized in this study, with only one significant interaction between
the type of evidence presented and gender of the juror, which occured in
the perceived likelihood of future crime scale.

This interaction showed

that different types of evidence influenced males and females
differently on how likely they felt the defendant was to be involved in
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future criminal activity.

Thus, the gender of a juror does not appear

to play a major role in influencing or altering the effects of evidence
concerning intent on suggested consequences of a criminal act, or on how
violent the jurors perceived the defendant was during the criminal act,
but it does, however, affect a juror's perception of how likely the
defendant is to be involved in future crime.

The different types of

evidence did not significantly alter male subject's opinions of
likelihood of future crime for the defendant, but the type of evidence
did make a difference with female subjects.

When presented with

evidence indicating that an act was intended, female jurors tended to
perceive the defendant as more likely to be recidivistic than male or
female jurors who are presented with evidence concerning
nonintentionality.

In addition, females who were presented with only

factual evidence (i.e.

no evidence suggesting intentionality) also

tended to believe the defendant was more likely of future crime than
males who were presented with nonintentional evidence.

Thus,

nonintentional evidence appears to have very similar influences on
perceptions of future crime for jurors of both sexes, but the effects of
evidence suggesting intent, or factual evidence alone, seem to be
amplified with female jurors and this amplification significantly
increases their perceptions of the defendants likelihood of future crime
(relative to the perceptions of jurors presented with nonintentional
evidence).

Precisely how this gender mediated affect is related to the

other scales is not entirely clear.

It is speculated, however, that it

is not significant in and of itself as the other scales do not show any
interaction between a juror's gender and the type of evidence presented.
21
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For example, male and female jurors will suggest very similar harsh
consequences for a defendant associated with evidence suggesting a
criminal act was intentional.

At the same time, jurors of both genders

will suggest less severe sentences for a defendant associated with
nonintentional evidence.

So, although juror perceptions of the

likelihood of recidivism may differ, the actual suggested consequences
are similar.

This supports the findings of Horai and Bartek (1978) who

also found that recommended punishment was independent of predictions of
future behavior.

Specific Scale Findings
The results strongly support the hypothesis that type of evidence
will affect the actual type of verdict given, if the jurors are given
this choice.

Specifically, if given the option, both male and female

jurors will give a defendant associated with evidence indicative of an
intentional act a harsher verdict, in this case Deliberate rather than
Negligent Homicide, relative to defendants associated with either
factual or nonintentional evidence.

Nonintentional evidence has the

opposite affect on Juror's choice of verdict, in that if they have been
presented with nonintentional evidence there will be a significantly
greater number of choices for a more lenient verdict (relative to jurors
presented with factual or intentional evidence).

Thus, when the choice

of a verdict is left to the jurors, the type of evidence which has been
presented will be a significant influencing factor.
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Mot only does type of evidence influence the verdict choice, but,
as mentioned above, it concomitantly affects the severity of the
suggested sentence.

Once again, intentional evidence is associated with

a more severe sentence, relative to nonintentional evidence.

Thus, it

is speculated that if there is a preponderance of evidence suggesting an
act was Intentional, then

the defendant can expect a more severe verdict

and sentence (at least if

the crime was homicide). Nonintentional

evidence tends to cause jurors to suggest less severe sentences relative
to factual evidence alone, and more importantly, it results in much less
severe suggested prison sentences relative to evidence indicating an
intentional act.

In this study, the severity of the average suggested

sentence associated with evidence indicative of a nonintentional act was
approximately 1.3& times less than the severity of the average suggested
sentence for evidence indicating intent.
As mentioned above, type of evidence also significantly affected
subjects suggested parole

for the defendant.

evidence resulted in a longer

Once again intentional

suggested parole for the defendant, which

was significantly greater than suggested paroles in both the fact and
nonintentional conditions.

The fact that the nonintentional and fact

groups did not significantly differ on this measure is overshadowed by
the fact that the intentional and nonintentional groups did once again
differ significantly.

From this it is speculated that evidence

concerning a defendant's Intentions does play an important role in
determining suggested length of parole, in that evidence to commit a
criminal act will bring about a longer parole (as well as a more severe
suggested sentence and verdict, as noted above), relative to evidence of
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pure fact or nonintentionality.

This may be the result of jurors

feeling that if one definitely intended to commit a crime, that person
should be watched more closely in the future.

On the other hand, it

could also just be a continuation of a more severe treatment (as
demonstrated on the severity of sentence measure).

Regardless of how it

is perceived by the subjects, however, intentional evidence does appear
to lengthen suggested parole by the jurors.

It is important to note

that nonintentional evidence does not significantly decrease length of
parole relative to evidence of pure fact, but since evidence concerning
intent (in a general sense) is usually, if not always a topic of
controversy in a trial, these differences between intentional and
nonintentional evidence are of prime importance.
The responsibility scale is the only scale on which no significance
was found.

This suggests that regardless of type of evidence, all

subjects considered the defendant to be approximately equally
responsible for the criminal act.

Exactly how this perceived

responsibility for an act relates to jurors suggested consequences,
perceived likelihood of future crime, and how violent the defendant was
perceived to be during the criminal act, remains unclear.

It is

speculated however, that perceived responsibility may play a role in
certain cases, but is not necessarily a central factor in determining a
juror's suggested consequences or other perceptions.

In other words,

presentation of evidence of intent or nonintent may not significantly
alter a juror's perception of how responsible a defendant is for his or
her actions, but it will affect other perceptions concerning the
defendant (level of violence and likelihood of future crime), as well as
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suggested consequences.

Therefore, responsibility does not appear to

be, in this case, a major factor which jurors use to determine verdict,
sentence, suggested parole, or likelihood of future crime.
Juror’s perceived likelihood of future crime for the defendant is
also influenced by type of evidence.
mediated by gender.

In addition, this affect is

When asked to rate how likely they felt the

defendant was to be involved in future similar crime, females in all
groups had an average rating greater than males in the same conditions
(not a statistically significant difference, however).

Not only did

females in the intent condition give significantly higher ratings than
males and females in the nonintent groups, as well as males in the fact
group, but concomitantly male jurors average ratings did not
significantly differ based on type of evidence the subject jurors were
presented with.

This may be due to the fact that males found it easier

to Identify with the male defendant, and as a result did not feel he was
overly likely to commit a future act, but this needs to be clarified in
future research,

it is also important to note that male and female

jurors’ ratings in the same experimental conditions did not differ
significantly.

That is, females in, for example, the intentional

evidence group did not have significantly higher ratings on this scale
than males in the same group.

The numerically higher ratings for

females did, however, lead to significant differences between the
different experimental conditions (groups).

Regardless of the reasons

behind this gender mediated difference, likelihood of future crime does
not appear to be a significant factor in a practical sense.

That is, it

is not directly manifested in one of the other scales which relate to
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how the defendant will actually be treated.

In other words, even though

females tend to perceive the defendant as more likely to be recidivistic
(especially if they were presented with evidence indicating an act was
intended) than do males, the suggested consequences are similar.

Once

again, this finding supports what Horai and Bartek (1978) found;

actual

suggested consequences are independant of predictions of future crime.
How violent the defendant was perceived to be in the criminal act
was also influenced by type of evidence, as hypothesized.

A defendant

associated with intentional evidence was seen as significantly more
violent than one associated with nonintentional evidence.

These

results, in all likelihood, help explain the results for verdict choice,
sentence severity and length of parole.

The more violent one is

perceived to be in the criminal act the harsher the suggested
consequences for the act.

The opposite was also true, in that

nonintentional evidence resulted in Jurors seeing the defendant as less
violent in the act (relative to intentional evidence), and concomitant
with this the defendant was given less severe consequences.

General Comments
On several of the measures in this study the nonintent and intent
conditions do not differ significantly from the fact condition.
However, usually, if not always, the question of a defendant's
intentions are of prime importance, and as a result evidence concerning
a defendant's intentions is introduced to the jurors.

Thus, that

subjects' responses in the nonintent and intent conditions do not differ
significantly from the responses of sujects in the fact condition is
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not, in and of itself important.

This argument is believed to hold true

for all measures in the present study, as the primary differences which
this research attempted to set-apart and analyze were the differences
between intentional and nonintentional evidence, and their respective
affects on the suggested consequences for a defendant.
present study appears to be quite successful.

To this end, the

The presentation of

evidence to commit a criminal act results in significantly harsher
suggested consequences for the defendant, as compared to evidence
suggesting nonintentionality, regardless of juror gender.

One must be

very cautious, however, in attempting to generalize these findings to
criminal cases which do not involve homicide.

Jurors’ reactions to

differing types of evidence may differ significantly if, for example,
the criminal charge was Assault or Vandalism.

It is also important to

keep in mind that the results of this study alone are not enough to make
strong generalizing speculations or interpretations.

In keeping with

Loh’s (1981) suggestions, this study attempted to "stay close" to the
data in order to be more sensitive to the lawyer’s point of view.
It is suggested that future research combine these two types of
evidence (intentional and nonintentional) to determine how they might
interact to affect the jurors perceptions of, and suggested consequences
for the defendant.

This would be a more applicable study to the "real"

world situation, since the two types of evidence obviously co-exist in
the courtroom (and since we now have empirical evidence suggesting their
differential effects).

It will, of course, be impossible (if not

impractical) to control for all intermediary factors, such as
persuasiveness of the attorneys, witnesses and defendant(s), but this
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could be minimized in several ways.

These findings are only the

beginning, as little research has been directed at this specific area,
and they indicate the need for further research to elucidate and clarify
the actual effects of intentional and nonintentional evidence In the
courtroom.

28

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

References

Applebaum, P. s., Mlrkln, S. A., & Bateman, A. L. {198D.
Empirical
assesment of competency to consent to psychiatric hospitilization.
American Journal of Psychiatry, 138, 1170-1176.
Blumstein, A., Cohen, J ., & Nagin, D ., eds.
(1978). Deterrence and
incapacitation: Estimating the effects of criminal sanctions~ôn
crime rates. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Science.
Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al.
States Reports, 347, 483-496.

(1954).

United

Brown, R. C., & Tedeschi, J. T.
(1976). Determinants of perceived
aggression. Journal of Social Psychology, 100, 77-87.

Dayton, C. M., & Schafer, W. D. (1973). Extended Tables of t and Chi
Square for Bonferroni Tests with Unequal Error Allocation. Journal
of American Statistical Association. ^(341).
Fahr, S. M. (1961). Why lawyers are dissatisfied with the social
sciences. Woodburn Law Journal, 2, 161-175.
Gerbasl, K. C., Zuckerman, M., & Reis, H. T. (1977). Justice needs a
new blindfold: A review of mock jury research. Psychological
Bulletin. 84, 323-3*5.
Harvey, M. D., & Enzle, M. E. (1978). Effects of retaliation latency
and provocation level on judged blameworthiness for retaliatory
aggression. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 4,
579-587.
Heider, F.
York:

(1958).
Wiley.

Die psychology of interpersonal relations. New

Hinkle A., Smeltzer, D., Allen, C., & King, G. (1983). The judgements
of college students and jurors concerning sanity and guilt of an
alleged murderer. The Journal of Social Psychology, 120, 233-237.
Holm, 0. (1982). The effects of intent, reason, and harm on
attribution of aggressiveness. Journal of Psychology, 110, 49-52.
Horai, J. (1977).
23 , 88- 100.

Attributional conflict.

Journal of Social Issues,

Horai, J. & Bartek, M. (1978). Recommended punishment as a function
of injurious intent, actual harm done, and intended consequences.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4(4), 575-578.
Kaplan, K., & Simon, R.

(1972).

Latitude and severity of sentencing

29

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

options, race of the victim and decisions of simulated jurors:
Some issues arising from the Algiers Motel trial. Law and Society
Review. 7, 87-98.
^
Loh, W. D. (1979). Psychology and law: A coming of age.
Contemporary Psychology, 24, 164-166.
Loh, W. D. (1981). Perspectives on psychology and law.
Applied Social Psychology, j_1, 314-355.

Journal of

Monahan J., & Loftus, E. F. (1982).
of Psychology, ]], 441-475.

Annual Review

Muensterberg, H. (1908).
and crime. New York:

Psychology of law.

On the witness stand: Essays on psychology
Clark, Boardman,

Nemeth, C. (1981) Jury trials: Psychology and law.
Experimental Social Psychology. 14» 309-367.

Advances in

Nickel, T. W. (1974). The attribution of intent as a critical factor
in the relation between frustration and aggression. Journal of
Personality. 4^, 482-492.
Pasewark, R. , Pantle, M.
L., & Steadman, H. J. (1976).
Characteristics and dispositions of persons found not guilty by
reason of insanity in New York state, 1971-1976. American Journal
of Psychiatry, 136, 655-660.
Robinson, D. N.

(1935).

Law and lawyers.

Rule, B. G., & Duker, P.(1973). Effects of Intentions and
consequences on childrens evaluations of aggressors. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 27, 184-189.
Saks, M.
J. (1979).
892.

On Tapp

(and Levine).

Saks, M. J., & Hastle, R. (1978).
York: Van Nostrand, Reinhold.

Michigan Law Review, 77,

Social psychology in court. New

Schwartz, 0. S., Kane, T. R., Joseph, J. ML, & Tedeschi, J. T.
(1978). The effectsof post-transgression remorse on perceived
aggression, attribution of intent and level of punishment. British
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 17, 293-298.
Shaw, M.
EL, & Reitan, H.
T. (1969). Attribution of responsibility
as a basis for sanctioning behaviour. British Journal of Social
and Clinical Psychology, 8, 217-226.
Shaw, H.
EL, & Sulzer, J.
L. (1964). An empirical test of Heider's
levels in attribution of responsibility. Journal of Abnormal and

30

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Social Psychology, 69, 39-46.
Sulzer, J. L., & Burglass, R. K. (1968). Responsibility attribution,
empathy, and punitiveness. Journal of Personality, 36, 272-282.

31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix A
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Thank you for being here today. To begin this study you are first
going to read the legal definitions concerning homicide in the state of
Montana, and then you will read information about an actual homicide
committed in Montana. You will then be asked to determine a verdict
just as you would in a jury trial, and in addition, you will be asked
other questions about the case. Please consider your answers to the
questions very carefully, as your answers will be compared to verdicts
returned by jurors in similar cases.
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Montana Homicide Statute
Under current Montana Law a person is charged with criminal
homicide if he purposely, knowingly, or negligently causes the death of
another human being. The following definitions are taken from existing
Montana Code.

Deliberate Homicide:
Criminal homicide constitutes deliberate homicide
if it is committed purposely or knowingly;...

Negligent Homicide:
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when
it is committed negligently. A person acts negligently
when he should have been aware of but disregards a
risk that the result will occur or that a circumstance
exists.
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On October 2, 1982, Richard Allen and Mark Williams had been
playing pool in a downtown bar.

That night they had argued and Mark

left the bar after the bartender threatened to call the police.
Approximately two weeks later, on October 15, Mark returned to the bar,
saw Richard sitting alone at a table and sat down with him.

He

reportedly wanted to try to make things up with Richard and continue
being friends.

However, a short while later, Richard and Mark began

arguing again and were soon yelling and pushing each other.

When the

police arrived, Richard lay bleeding on the floor and Mark was standing
over him.

A hunting knife was laying on the floor between them.

Richard died of a stab wound on his way to the hospital.

Relevant Testimony
James Lee, a bartender working the night of the crime, testified
that Richard and Mark were regular customers and played pool there quite
often.

He told the court that he had seen them argue on other occasions

and had threatened to call the police during an argument two weeks
before the homicide.

On the night of the crime he called the police as

soon as he noticed the men arguing because he had already warned them.
Jim Cummings, a mutual friend of both Richard and Mark testified as
to events prior to the crime.

He told the court that Mark had recently

separated from his wife and she had threatened divorce.

During that

time Mark had turned to Richard for support and they had been spending a
lot of time together.

After the argument on October 2, Mark had told

Jim that his friendship with Richard was over and that Richard would pay
for the trouble he had caused.

Mr.

Cummings stated that Mark would not
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bell him any details, only that he and Richard had a major blowup and
Richard was going to "pay” for it.
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On October 2, 1982, Richard Allen and Mark Williams had been
playing pool in a downtown bar.

That night they had argued and Mark

left the bar after the bartender threatened to call the police.
Approximately two weeks later, on October 15, Mark returned to the bar,
saw Richard sitting alone at a table and sat down with him.

He

reportedly wanted to try to make things up with Richard and continue
being friends.

However, a short while later, Richard and Mark began

arguing again and were soon yelling and pushing each other.

When the

police arrived, Richard lay bleeding on the floor and Mark was standing
over him.

A hunting knife was laying on the floor between them.

Richard died of a stab wound on his way to the hospital.

Relevant Testimony
James Lee, a bartender working the night of the crime, testified
that Richard and Mark were regular customers and played pool there quite
often.

He told the court that he had seen them argue on other occasions

and had threatened to call the police during an argument two weeks
before the homicide.

On the night of the crime he called the police as

soon as he noticed the men arguing because he had already warned them.
Mr,

Lee told the court that he saw Richard laying on the floor and he

heard Mark say, "Oh, my God.
didn't mean to hurt him...

I never thought it would go this far.

I

quick someone call an ambulance.”

Jim Cummings, a mutual friend of both Richard and Mark testified as
to events prior to the crime.

He told the court that Mark had recently

separated from his wife and she had threatened divorce.

During that

time Mark had turned to Richard for support and they had been spending a
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lot of time together.

After the argument on October 2, Mark had told

Jim that his friendship with Richard was over.

Mr.

Cummings stated

that Mark would not tell him any details, only that he and Richard had a
major blowup.
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On October 2, 1982, Richard Allen and Mark Williams had been
playing pool in a downtown bar.

That night they had argued and Mark

left the bar after the bartender threatened to call the police.
Approximately two weeks later, on October 15, Mark returned to the bar,
saw Richard sitting alone at a table and sat down with him.

He

reportedly wanted to try to make things up with Richard and continue
being friends.

However, a short while later, Richard and Mark began

arguing again and were soon yelling and pushing each other.

When the

police arrived, Richard lay bleeding on the floor and Mark was standing
over him.

A hunting knife was laying on the floor between them.

Richard died of a stab wound on his way to the hospital.

Relevant Testimony
James Lee, a bartender working the night of the crime, testified
that Richard and Mark were regular customers and played pool there quite
often.

He told the court that he had seen them argue on other occasions

and had threatened to call the police during an argument two weeks
before the homicide.

On the night of the crime he called the police as

soon as he noticed the men arguing because he had already warned them.
Jim Cummings, a mutual friend of both Richard and Mark testified as
to events prior to the crime.

He told the court that Mark had recently

separated from his wife and she had threatened divorce.

During that

time Mark had turned to Richard for support and they had been spending a
lot of time together.

After the argument on October 2, Mark had told

Jim that his friendship with Richard was over.

Mr.

Cummings stated

that Mark would not tell him any details, only that he and Richard had a
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major blowup.
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1.) I, student juror, do find the defendant, Mark Williams, guilty of:
(circle one)
Deliberate Homicide

Negligent Homicide

) The maximum sentence for Deliberate Homicide in Montana is 100 years
in prison. The maximum sentence for Negligent Homicide is 40 years
in prison. Please indicate the sentence that you feel would be
most appropriate.
(Use the scale corresponding to your verdict and
circle a whole number. The death penalty
not an option.)

2a.) If you chose:
Deliberate Homicide

No time
served

Years

Maximum
sentence

2a.) If you chose;
Mitigated Homicide
12 "

No time
served

3.)

"

"

1

^

^

20“

“

“ 24

"

“

33“

Years

“

“ 40

Maximum
Sentence

How long should the defendant be placed on parole after
being released from prison? (Regardless of length of
prison sentence.)

Q———4———8———12“““16“““20“““24“““23“““32“““33“““40
No parole
suggested

4.)

Years
after release
from prison

Long parole
suggested

How responsible was the defendant for his actions?

0—

1— 2—

3—

4— 5— 6“““7— 3“““9—

Not at all
responsible

10
Completely
responsible
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5.)

How likely is this person to commit a similar crime
in the future?

Very
unlikely

6.)

Very
likely

How physically violent was the defendant in this act?

Q——— I

—

^—

^—

^

Not at all
violent

^

^Q
Very
violent
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Please provide the information asked for below.
held strictly confidential.

Everything will be

Age__
Sex M F (circle one)

Year in college:

1 2 3 4 Grad (circle one)

Major:_______

Have you ever served on a jury before?

Yes No (circle one)

Have you or anyone close to you been the victim of a violent crime?
Yes No (circle one)

If yes, what was the nature of that crime?

(Explain)

I, (do, do not) promise not to discuss the nature of this research
with anyone for a period of one month. (Circle one)
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